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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD L. A. PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

REX VANCE, Sheriff of Salt Lake
:County, State of Utah,

Case No. 15944

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, RICHARD L. A. PHILLIPS, appeals from the
, dismissal of his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After denial of the appellant's Motion for Continuance
and following proffer of evidence by the appellant's counsel, the
iht of Habeas Corpus was dismissed and the appellant was remanded

to the custody of the respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the District Court's dismissal
::~is petition reversed and to have the Petition for a lvrit of

ca'leas Corpus reinstated with an order granting appellant the re-~sted

pre-trial discovery.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 26, 1978, the appellant filed a Petition for a Wri:
of Habeas Corpus (R. 2).

On June 18, 1978, the appellant filed a

Motion for Production of Documents pertaining
in the lower court (R. 4).

to appellant's claim

On June 22, 1978, the appellant filed

a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the appellant
from being taken out of the state while the proceedings were ongoim'
(R.

7).

On June 29, 1978, Judge Peter F. Leary of the Third
Judicial District Court heard the Motion for a Temporary Restrainb;
Order (R. 8).

At that time the appellant was given the documents

requested in the Motion for Production of Documents and the respon·
dent filed an Answer to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
In addition, the Court granted a temporary restraining order for thE
period of one week and set the matter over for hearing to July 6,
1978 (R. 8).
On July 3, 1978, the appellant filed a series of interrogatories (R. ll).

On July 5, 1978, the appellant filed a Motion

for a Continuance on the matter to be heard on July 6 (R. 15).
On July 6, 1978, the matter came on for hearing on the
appellant's Motion for a Continuance (R. 28).
(R. 34).

That motion was den~'

The matter then proceeded immediately to a hearing.

Appellant did not call any witnesses.

The appellant proffered

t~d

the evidence that would have been available to him had the interrogatories been answered by the respondent (R. 32).

At this ?oir.:
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the Court denied the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (R. 35).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO CONDUCT
LIMITED DISCOVERY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF APPOINTED
COUNSEL WHICH WAS RELEVANT TO HIS CLAIM ON HIS
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
The appellant in this case has contested the legality of
his possible extradition as provided in Utah Code Ann. §77-56-10

(1953 as amended) by filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
alleging that his arrest and restraint were illegal (R. 2).
Petitioner contended that he was not within the demanding state
(California) at the time that the offense whjch he had been accused
of committing was perpetrated (R. 29).

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the appellant filed interrogatories on
the respondent on July 3, 1978 (R. 11).

On July 5, 1978, the

appellant filed a motion for a continuance because the interrogatories
had not yet been answered (R. 12).

1978 (R. 12).

The motion was denied on July 6,

The Court found that the State had made its prima

facie case and then gave its reasoning for denying the motion for
a continuance:
And it would seem to the Court that the items
that you're suggesting to the Court are matters
that vou desire to discover are also matters that
would~be well within the --within your client's
knowledge. At least I don't suppose that if you
think he was under surveillance or something that
he could itemize that, but he certainly must have
some idea where he was at the time of the alleged
offense.
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Now, if there are witnesses that he could
tell you about or so on, I think that he's had
adequate time to do that.
The Court does not
think that this is the appropriate proceeding
for any fishing expedition upon his part in
connection with any prosecution, nor do I think
that it's the responsibility of the State of
Utah to endeavor to obtain any information for
you in connection with these matters.
The State of Utah has done its job in
connection with the matter in presenting or making
a prima facie case, and that apparently has been
done through the filing of the various documents.
And I am assuming that, having perused those,
you certainly have not indicated any objection
to the documents as such.
And unless you have
something else, why, I'll make a ruling in
connection with the matter.
(R. 31-32).
In other words,

the Court felt that the discovery was improper and

that was the Court's basis for denying the appellant's motion.
The question of the applicability of civil discovery to
habeas corpus proceedings has never been dealt with directly by
Court.

~L

However, Rule 8l(a) of the URCP provides:
Special Statutory Proceedings.
These Rules shall
apply to all special statutory proceedings, except
in so far as such Rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of the former
Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be
in accordance with these Rules.
Habeas Corpus procedures are covered by Rule 64B of the

URCP.

The procedures for the petition and answer are covered by

that rule, but the rule does not describe any other procedures
that are to be applied.

The other procedures to be applied in

habeas corpus hearings must be governed by the URCP.

Such pro-
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cedures must include discovery by the parties.
In Aldridge v. Beckstead, 16 Utah 2d 136, 396 P.2d 870
(1964),

this Court noted in dictum that such procedures may be

applicable in habeas corpus.

The Court stated:

Dictum-wide, nonetheless, we observe that
petitioner urges that habeas corpus proceedings
are civil, not criminal;
that the Rules of
Civil Procedure are applicable; that so being,
his motions to entertain the discovery process
of interrogatories, deposition and examination
of documents were violated by their denial.
Everything petitioner requested by motion was
available to him as a matter of public record.
396 P.2d at 870.
Since this was a special statutory proceeding and the
special rules applicable to such proceedings do not conflict with
the application of Rule 33 of the URCP as was sought in this case,
the appellant was entitled to the discovery under Rule 8l(a) of
the URCP.

Furthermore, the answers to the interrogatories sought

here do not conflict with the exception to Rule 8l(a) which provides
"except in so far as such Rules are by their nature inapplicable".
The applicability has been determined by the United States Supreme
Court which has held general civil discovery to be inappropriate in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.

However, the Court did find,

that in appropriate circumstances, a district
court, confronted by a petition of habeas
corpus which establishes a prima facie case
for relief, may use or authorize the use of
suitable discovery procedures, including
interrogatories, reasonably fashioned to
elicit facts necessary to help the court to
'diapose of the matter as law and justice
require'.
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286
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at 290, 22 L.Ed.2d 281, 89 S.Ct. 1082,
reh. den. 394 U.S. 1025, 23 L.Ed. 2d 50,
89 S.Ct. 1623 (1969).
In that case,

the United States Supreme Court found that general

civil discovery was not appropriate on habeas corpus for three
basic reasons.

The first was because of the history of both the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal habeas corpus made
such discovery inapplicable.

The second reason was that some forns

of discovery would be inappropriate in habeas corpus proceedings.
The final reason was that there was a great deal of potential for
abuse of discovery by prisoners who would be acting without the
guidance and restraint of members of the bar.
However,

the Court in Harris v. Nelson, supra, did not

find, as noted above,

that civil discovery was completely inappro-

priate in habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court held that the district courts are to have discretion in allowing such discovery and stated:
We do not assume that courts in the exercise
of their discretion will pursue or authorize
pursuit of all allegations presented to them.
We are aware that confinement sometimes induces
fantansy which has its basis in the paranoia
of prison rather than in fact.
But where
specific allegations before the court show
reason to believe that the petitioner may,
if the facts are fully developed, be able to
demonstrate that he is confined illegally and
is therefore, entitled to relief, it is the duty
of the court to provide the necessary facilities
and procedures for an adequate inquiry.
Obviously, in exercising this power, the co~rt
may utilize familiar procedures, as approprlate,
whether these are found in the civil or criminal
rules or else where in the "usages and principles
of lmv."
(footnote omitted)
394 U.S. at 300.
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The Court found that the federal district courts had the power
to allow such limited discovery under the All Writs Act,28 United
States Code §1651.
Even though Utah does not have a statute similar to the
All Writs Act, such limited discovery may still be appropriate.
The Colorado Supreme Court was faced with the same problem in the
case of Hithe v. Nelson, 471 P.2d 596 (1970).

In that case, as in

the case at hand, the habeas corpus petitioner was challenging his
being held for extradition.

The Court held that the habeas corpus

petitioner does not have an "unrestricted and unmodified" right to
civil discovery, but discovery would be available if it was "clearly
shown that the matters sought to be discovered will be relevant
to the very narrow issue of a habeas corpus hearing", 471 P. 2d at
598.

In the case at hand the appellant was seeking discovery
of only those matters relevant to his claim.

He sought to discover

the time and place of the occurrence of the crime he was accused
of committing and whether the government had him under surveillance
at that time, and if he was under surveillance he sought to discover
the government's information as to this whereabouts.

Consequently,

the fears expressed in Harris v. Nelson, supra, were not present
here because the petitioner was seeking very limited discovery and
because the discovery was conducted under the guidance and restraint
of counsel, thus minimizing the potential for abuse.
This information was necessary for the appellant's case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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for several reasons.

The first is that the government's informatic

may allow the appellant to prove his case without having to waive
his privilege

against self incrimination.

The second is that

such evidence may be regarded by the court as more credible than
the appellant's assertions which the court may feel are self -servin;
in nature.

Finally, since the appellant is presently incarcerated

in the Salt Lake County Jail and the crime was alleged to have
occurred in California such discovery may have been a great aid
to the appellant and to the court by helping him locate evidence
at a minimal expense.

For these reasons, the trial court connnitted

error in not allowing the appellant to conduct the limited discover;.
which he sought.

This error was prejudicial because without the

information sought, the appellant was completely unable to meet his
burden of proof and with such information the burden may have been
met.

The trial court's ruling must be reversed and the case

remanded to the district court to allow the appropriate discovery
and a hearing on the appellant's claim.
CONCLUSION
The court order denying appellant's motion for continuance to allow him to conduct limited discovery was an abuse of
discretion.

The discovery was of a very limited nature and it

is obvious that the information was readily available.

This is

because it had to be in the possession of either the Utah or
California authorities.

Consequently, the delay in obtaining the
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information would have been minimal.

When such delay is balanced

against the loss the appellant incurred by having his petition
denied, it becomes obvious that the Court abused its discretion
in denying the motion for continuance and as a result denying
the discovery which would follow from that continuance.
Respectfully submitted,

BRAD RICH
Attorney for Appellant
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